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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
IN A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: 
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Charles F. Abernathy* 
Sovereign immunity: the term sounds curious in a nation that is 
beginning to celebrate the bicentennial of its independence from the 
British sovereign George III. Very early in our history we took steps 
to insure that the.rule of law, as expressed in the Constitution, would 
prevail over the mortals who run our government.• Yet even as the 
concepts of rule of law and judicial review came into ascendancy, we 
also harbored the sovereign immunity doctrine as a restraint on 
judicial power and as an apparent repudiation of the rule of law. 
Indeed, in its most extreme form the doctrine has come to stand for 
judicial incapacity to redress governmental action that is known to 
be unconstitutional. 2 
The inherent antagonism between the rule of law and the 
sovereign immunity doctrine has produced much mischief in our 
courts, some of which will be considered in this Article. On its face, 
the very notion of judicial power versus "sovereign" power is an 
anomaly in our three-part plan of national government: the judicial 
branch created by article III is just as much a part of our government 
as the executive and legislative branches.3 In fact, "sovereign" 
immunity is a misnomer; for the doctrine applies only to prevent 
* Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala.; Assistant 
Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center (beginning in Sept., 1975). A.B. Harvard, 
1969; J.D. 1973 .. The author represented the plaintiffs in Penn v. Schlesinger, which is 
discussed in this Article. 
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. {I Cranch) 137 (1803). For modern analogues, 
see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
1 See, e.g., Edelman v, Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 
U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
J U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. The word "sovereign" appears nowhere in the 
Constitution, not even in the eleventh amendment, which was passed to restore 
sovereign immunity for the states. Seep. 330 infra. 
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suits against the executive and legislative branches; the Court has 
developed a separate "judicial" immunity to prevent certain suits 
against persons within the judicial branch.4 
Cast in this light, sovereign immunity becomes not a mystical 
question of sovereign power but a practical issue of the powers and 
immunities of the separate branches of government. Indeed, this 
Article will argue that the sovereign immunity doctrine is not 
anticonstitutional, but rather reflects the Constitution's allocation of 
power among the three branches of government. The Court's 
development of sovereign immunity principles, as we shall see, 
implicitly recognizes this separation of powers rationale. 
In exploring this rationale for sovereign immunity, this Article 
will assume a dual personality. Section I is devoted to an intensive 
consideration of one area of the law-employment discrimination 
suits against federal officers-where application of the sovereign 
immunity doctrine has generated considerable confusion and 
attehdant injustice. A conventional analysis will show how the 
Sup-reme Court developed certain basic rules of sovereign immunity 
law, how the courts of appeals have applied these rules generally, and 
how the rules came to be misapplied by several courts in employment 
discrimination cases. The analysis in the first Section will also lay the 
essential case law groundwork for the more general considerations 
discussed in the latter two-thirds of the Article. 
Sections II and III will develop the separation of powers 
rationale for sovereign immunity, showing how the immunity 
principles adopted by the Supreme Court implicitly define the 
decisionmaking powers of the separate branches. Section II will show 
how sovereign immunity considerations can enter a lawsuit at two 
distint stages-in the initial pleadings and at the relief phase of the 
case. Section III will show how separation of powers considerations 
work at each of these two stages to allocate constitutional power to 
one branch or another. First, it discusses the traditional sovereign 
immunity rules that have been applied at the pleading stage and 
shows how they reflect separation of powers notions. Then it 
suggests that these same notions produce fair and effective results at 
the relief stage of the inquiry, the stage where courts are just now 
• See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) Uudicial immunity); Yaselli 
v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affd mem., 215 U.S. 503 (1927) (court officers); cf 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. 
Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL ·sYSTEM 1410-23 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & 
WECHSLER]. 
324 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10 
trying to fashion some coherent rationale for their decisions. A final 
part of Section III will bring the paper full circle. It will illustrate how 
the separation of powers rationale works by applying it to some of 
the difficult problems of relief in the area of federal employment 
discrimination. 
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
A black person in Alabama has a greater chance of getting a job 
with George Wallace's state government than with the federal 
government. With blacks making up over 25 percent of the state 
population, only seven percent of state employees are black;5 in 
comparison, only six percent of federal employees in Alabama are 
black.6 Indeed, the federal government's performance in Alabama is 
so notorious that state agencies accused of racist employment 
practices have begun to defend themselves in court by showing that 
they are less discriminatory than the federal government.' Nor is the 
federal government's record in Alabama very unusual. While the 
federal agencies' employment figures do not so blatantly scream 
discrimination elsewhere in the nation,8 there is reason to believe that 
the United States government is not the equal opportunity employer 
that most of us thought it to be.9 
'Complaint ,-r 42, Penn v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
affd, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). The 
hiring and promotion practices of Alabama's departments and agencies have been 
found to be racially discriminatory and are now under court supervision. See NAACP 
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974), affg 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); United 
States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
• U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Minority Group Employment in the Government, 
Doc. #SM 70-70B, Nov. 30, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Minority Group Employment]. 
If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Veterans Administration are 
excluded, the federal government's figure for black employment drops to 2.5 percent. 
Such statistics may be used in employment suits to prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination. See Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. 
REV. 128, 131-35 (1973). 
'See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 709 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 493 
F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). 
' See R. Rittenoure, BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH: THE CASE 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1-2, 138-66 (1972). The author concludes that 
blacks are generally underrepresented in federal employment in the southern states. 
Though adequately represented in the federal workforce outside the south, however, 
black employees are confined to the lower wage schedules. /d. at 1-2. 
• See id. at 1-2, 138-66; Minority Group Employment, supra note 6, passim. 
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The responsibility for this dismal record can be laid directly to 
the inadequacy of internal administrative complaint procedures10 and 
the ineffectiveness of the government's internal policing effort at 
both the agency11 and appellate level.12 In light of the difficulties of 
•• A congressional committee concluded in 1971 that the "disproportionatte [sic] 
distribution of minorities and women throughout the federal bureaucracy and their 
exclusion from higher level policy-making and supervisory positions indicates the 
government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity. 
"A critical defect of the Federal equal employment program has been the failure 
of the complaint process. That process has impeded rather than advanced the goal of 
elimination of discrimination in Federal employment." H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24 (1971). 
The grievance procedures are a model of bureaucratic obstructionism and delay. 
As originally designed, the regulations required that an aggrieved employee first 
approach a designated Equal Employment Qpportunity (EEO) Counselor within his 
agency or branch. The EEO Counselor was authorized to attempt to settle the 
grievance informally, but should that fail, he was required to advise the employee of 
the employee's right to file a formal, written complaint with an EEO officer. 5 C.F.R. 
§§ 713.213-.214 (1971). A hearing followed, and if the employee was dissatisfied with 
the initial results, he faced another series of appellate reviews, both within the agency 
and later with the Civil Service Commission. 5 C.F.R. § 713.215 (1971). 
These regulations were amended in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 22717 (1972). The 
regulations now in effect do not differ substantially from the original except that, in 
obedience to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 
(Supp. III, 1973), agencies are now required to resolve a complaint within 180 days of 
its filing. 5 C.F.R. § 713.220 (1974). 
" Agency enforcement consists largely of paper guarantees of fairness 
unsupported by· any concern for their implementation. Although the regulations 
require that agency counsellors advise the aggrieved employee of his administrative 
rights, 5 C.F.R. § 713.213(a) (1974), this is not always done. See Penn v. United States, 
350 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 491 F. 
2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). Moreover, enforcement personnel are put in a weak 
and contradictory position in relation to those whom they should police since strict 
enforcement might disrupt the agency and thJls bring retribution from above. 
12 Dissatisfied employees may carry their appeals to the Civil Service Com-
mission, where institutional forces also work against vigorous resolution of employee 
complaints. As a recent Public Interest Research Group study reports, the 
Commission suffers from a conflict of interest because most of its activities concern 
provision of management advice and support services to agency supervisors, a duty 
inherently incompatible with its oversight and review duties in the area of employee 
rights. R. Vaughn, THE SPOILED SYSTEM 11-55 (1972). Close contact with agency 
heads in providing management support creates at least the appearance of partiality in 
deciding employee complaints, an appearance reinforced by the Commission's 
practice of permitting direct ex parte contact between hearing examiners and agency 
heads concerning some employee appeals. ld. at Il-58, II-64. Even Civil Service 
Commission Chairman Robert Hampton remarked in 1972 that the assignment of an 
employee appeal function to his management oriented commission was "an 
anomaly." ld. at II-65. 
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obtaining relief through administrative procedures, the key to 
enforcing equal employment opportunities in the federal government 
must be the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
ensure that discriminatory practices are ended. For over a decade, 
executive orders have banned invidious discrimination in federal em-
ployment, 13 and Congress has declared that such discrimination is 
against federal policy. 14 But more is at stake than just these policy 
statements-the policy is grounded in the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the Constitution itself. 15 Thus the courts, in their role as 
protectors of individual constitutional rights, 16 are brought into the 
fray. 
Yet S!!Veral federal courts of appeals, covering states where 
11 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969), as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 11590, 36 Fed. Reg. 7831 (1971). 
"5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970) provides: "It is the policy of the United States to insure 
equal employment opportunities for employees without discrimination because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
15 Early cases sometimes noted that the Constitution contained no equal 
protection clause applicable to the federal government as the fourteenth amendment's 
clause applied to the states. See, e.g., LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 
377, 392 (1921). Yet over the last quarter-century the Supreme Court has found such 
nondiscrimination principles to be implicit in our governmental system. Racial 
discrimination was declared by the Court to be against federal public policy in Hurd v. 
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), and the ban on federal racial discrimination has since 1954 
been read into the fifth amendment's due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954). While Bolling and later cases used language that suggested that 
perhaps only egregious cases of discrimination were covered by the fifth amendment's 
due process clause, see, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (dis-
crimination "so unjustifiable" as to violate due process covered), in practice the 
Court's mode of analysis has been identical in both federal and state discrimination 
cases. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (claims arising in 
the District of Columbia under the due process clause and in several states subject to 
the equal protection clause disposed of in same manner). Compare Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Even the 
arguably limiting language has been dropped in recent cases. See, e.g., Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974). See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 
F.2d 623,635 (2d Cir. 1974). The antidiscrimination principles of the fifth amendment 
apply to the full range of federal governmental activities, including employment 
discrimination by federal departments and agencies. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. 
Ct. 572 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). (The type of discrimination at issue, e.g., sex, race, 
would relate only to the standard of court review, just as in state equal protection 
cases, and not to the issue of coverage itself. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, at 
682.) 
16 See note 29 infra. 
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federal employment discrimination is greatest, 17 have held that 
sovereign immunity prevented them from banning employment 
discrimination by federal officials. The first such case, Gnotta v. 
United States, 18 was a suit by a federal civil service employee who 
claimed that his immediate supervisor had denied him advancement 
and supplemental job training because of his Italian ancestry. Such 
discrimination based on alienage is patently unconstitutional, 19 but in 
an opinie;n written by Judge (now Justice) Blackmun, an Eighth 
Circuit panel ruled that Gnotta's suit was barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. Fifth20 and Sixth21 Circuit cases have followed 
this position and have applied the doctrine to bar suits in which black 
federal employees claimed that they had been fired or denied 
promotion solely on the basis of their race. While recent decisions 
from the Fifth22 and Ninth Circuits23 have tried to open the door to at 
least partial relief, they leave much of the immunity defense intact.24 
More importantly, even these modifications of the Gnotta position 
show a continuing misunderstanding of the immunity doctrine, a 
misunderstanding that perpetuates confusion and injustice. 
The impact of the sovereign immunity defense continues to be 
felt in the federal employment sector despite the passage of the 1972 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which waives the sovereign 
immunity defense in part.25 Many claims only now being litigated 
arose before the Act's effective date/6 and, more importantly, the 
17 Cf. note 8 supra. The major southern states lie in the following circuits: Fourth 
(Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina), Fifth (Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas), Sixth (Tennessee, and border state Kentucky), and 
Eighth (Arkansas and border state Missouri). The case developments discussed in this 
Article have reached each of these circuits except the Fourth. 
"415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970). 
"See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886); cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (l943)(holding the same 
rule to apply to the United States as to a state). 
20 Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971). 
21 Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974); 
Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971). See Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 
412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974) (sex discrimination). 
22 Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). 
" Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). The court relied upon the 
Fifth Circuit decision in Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). 
" ~ee pp. 341-43 infra. 
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l6(c) (Supp. III, 1973). 
"See, e.g., Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Place v. 
Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974); Bramblett v. 
Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974). The latter two cases 
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1972 Act does not waive immunity for all agencies and departments27 
nor does it cover all types of discrimination.28 Thus, many federal 
employment suits will be brought without benefit of the partial 
statutory waiver of immunity, and plaintiffs in these cases must 
depend for the success of their claims29 upon court reversal of the 
Gnotta-type precedents. 
Nor does the impact of Gnotta stop with employment cases or 
federal defendants. The sovereign immunity doctrine can be applied 
held that the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act is not retroactive, thus leaving 
in place for a time the sovereign immunity bar that the Sixth Circuit had adopted 
before the act's passage. See Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th'Cir. 1971). The 
Fourth Circuit, however, has granted some relief to plaintiffs whose claims predated 
the waiver statute, ruling that the statute applies retroactively to cover at least those 
claims that were already in the administrative complaint process on the effective date 
of the 1972 Act. See Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. III, 1973). 
1
' Only certain kinds of discrimination are prohibited; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) 
(Supp. Ill, 1973) (race, color, religion, sex, national origin). While the areas in which 
immunity is waived cover most traditional bases for discrimination, some currently 
important bases that might be unconstitutional are not named, e.g., alien status, see 
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 
944 (1974); marital status, compare United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528 (1973), with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); Indian tribal 
status, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); illegitimacy, cf Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); and sexual orientation and status related to sex (e.g., 
pregnancy), cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,496 n.20 (1974). 
19 The question may arise whether claims pursued outside the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 state a cause of action since that statute not only waives 
sovereign immunity in part but also specifically provides a cause of action for the 
aggrieved employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III, 1973). This issue, 
however, presents no real problem, as causes of action for unconstitutional 
deprivations are implied directly from the Constititution itself, at least where 
injunctive relief is the remedy sought. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The rule is also 
implicit in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), where the Court found no 
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and consequently no jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Rather than dismiss the complaint, the Court remanded 
for a determination of whether jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), id. 
at 515, a remand that would have been fruitless unless the Court considered there to be 
an independent cause of action stated directly under the Constitution. See The 
Supreme Court: 1972 Term. 87 HARV. L. REV. 252,261-62 & nn. 53,55 (1973). 
Plaintiffs claiming racial discrimination can also base their cause of action on the 
statutory authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See note 121 infra. See 
Bowers v, Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 
rev'd 011 other grou11ds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane); cf. District of Columbia 
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 422 (1973) (involving§ 1982, companion provision to§ 1981, 
and holding federal action covered). 
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by analogy to suits in any subject matter area,30 and since 
government attorneys as a matter of course plead sovereign 
immunity in almost every case against federal officials/1 there is 
every opportunity for the doctrine to creep into the full range of such 
suits.32 Moreover, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
applied identically to the states and the federal government/3 the 
Gnotta ruling could apply with equal vigor to state action which 
violated constitutional commands.34 
With these implications in mind, we can now turn to a brief 
review of the historical development of federal sovereign immunity 
doctrine to provide a basis for analyzing the doctrine in the 
employment discrimination context. 
A. Rise and Restriction of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
1. Supreme Court Development of the Doctrine and its Exceptions 
Sovereign immunity doctrine has been a source of much legal 
controversy.3s Often regarded as part of our English legal heritage/6 
"'For example, in Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971}, the court 
suggested that even Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which mandated school 
integration in the District of Columbia, would have been decided contrarily had the 
Court considered the sovereign immunity issue. 
"See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need 
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties 
Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387,420 n.152 (1970). 
" See pp. 335-36 infra. 
33 U.S. CONST. amend XI. But see pp. 331-32 infra. 
"Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding a federal court's award of 
retroactive welfare benefits barred by the eleventh amendment). One recent certiorari 
petition has claimed that a federal court's affirmative order of injunctive relief against 
defendant state officials violates the eleventh amendment. Petition for Certiorari, 
Crisler v. Morrow, No. 73-1838, 43 U.S.L.\V. 3054 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1974), petitioning 
for cert. to 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). 
>s Commentators have often complained of the injustices the doctrine produces 
and argued for legislative abolition. See, e.g., Laski, The Responsibility of the State in 
England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447 (1919); Cramton, supra note 31; Borchard, 
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), or for judicial reform of the 
doctrine, see Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other than 
Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954); Block, Suits Against Government Officers and 
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 (1946). 
36 See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 
HARV. L. REV. I, 2-19 (1963); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton). 
Professor Jaffe suggests that we have bastardized the English doctrine by emphasizing 
its strict theory rather than its lenient practice. He argues that the English practice 
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the doctrine has been an important political issue since soon after the 
Republic was founded. The Supreme Court, sitting in only its second 
term, refused to insulate a state from judgment in Chisholm v. 
Georgia. 31 That decision, however, was overridden by adoption in 
1798 of the eleventh amendment, which proclaimed sovereign 
immunity in suits against a state.38 Apparently chastised, the Court 
later extended the immunity by judicial fiat to the federal 
government as well.39 Later courts ingenuously repeated the bald 
proposition that "no government has ever held itself liable to 
individuals for the misfeasance .... of its officers,"40 ignoring that 
the opposite doctrine was applied in almost every western European 
country.41 Appropriately, the first Supreme Court opinion holding 
that the federal government enjoyed sovereign immunity cited no 
authority and gave no reason for the doctrine's adoption.42 
Although the Court embraced federal sovereign immunity with 
no analysis, it has sought with much deliberation to limit the 
doctrine's application. In the first case to analyze the issue 
comprehensively, United States v. Lee,43 a descendant of General 
Robert E. Lee sued to recover his estate, which had been seized by 
makes one wonder "whether as a practical matter [sovereign immunity) ever has 
existed. From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in 
the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And when 
it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was given as of 
course," Jaffe, supra, at I. He notes that English theory rather than practice was 
adopted in America at least in part because the states feared being sued on their debts. 
!d. at 19 & n.57. 
n 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
11 The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State," U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
The wording of the amendment, curiously, has been read both narrowly and 
broadly by the Court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890) (reading the 
amendment also to bar suits by the citizens of the same state); Duhne v. New Jersey, 
251 U.S. 311 (1920); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (immunity may be 
impliedly waived). 
J• Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-12 (1821) (dictum). 
'
0 Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269,274 (1868). 
"See Borchard, supm note 35, at 1, 2, 8 n. 24. 
'
1 United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846). Wide 
attention had been given to the concept of state sovereign immunity, however. See 
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton). 
" 106 U.S. 196 (1882). Judgment had been rendered in the circuit court, where the 
United States was not a party, against individual federal officials. The United States 
filed an appeal eo nomine.ld. at 196-97. 
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federal soldiers and converted into Arlington cemetery. It was 
admitted that, if authorized, the seizure would have been uncon-
stitutional because no compensation was paid.44 In a five-to-four 
decision the Court held that sovereign immunity was no bar to 
determining the case because the officers had acted outside their 
constitutional authority. 45 
This analysis, after several false starts,46 was later applied to 
enforce the Reconstruction amendments against states that claimed 
themselves protected from suit by the eleventh amendment. Giving 
full force to ideas that lurked beneath the surface of the Lee opinion, 
the Court reasoned in Ex parte Y ounlf1 that a state law that is 
unconstitutional is no law at all, and "the officer in proceeding under 
such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of 
[the] Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or 
representative character and is subjected in his person to the 
consequences of his individual conduct. " 48 
Sovereign immunity doctrine has fluctuated somewhat since the 
Lee and Young decisions,49 but the exception there recognized has 
remained the principal standard for removing the immunity bar. The 
two parallel lines of decision on state and federal sovereign immunity 
deviated for a time during the early twentieth century when the Court 
expressed a willingness to hear cases where the federal officials' 
.. /d. at 219-20. The federal Court of Claims had not yet been created when Lee 
was decided. Although the doctrine developed in Lee has remained important, the 
Court has applied the rules differently to land cases now that a remedy in the Court of 
Claims is available. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646-48 (1962). 
•• 106 U.S. at 218-19 & passim. A variety of other grounds were suggested, most 
of them resting on historical analysis. 
•• See generally C. Wright, FEDERAL COURTS 183-86 (2d ed. 1970). 
47 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
•• !d. at 159-60. The Court might have chosen to harmonize the direct conflict 
between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments, but it avoided that issue. c_[. Case 
Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1937). It is the purpose of this Section to give a brief 
overview of the development of sovereign immunity principles rather than to describe 
the underlying factors that motivated constitutional decisionmaking. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted here that the conflict in Young between the eleventh and fourteenth 
amendments is a contest between the Court's institutional power to decide 
constitutional questions, see Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and 
those state forces that wish to insulate their activities from such review, see Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In this light, the Young holding becomes a reaffirmation of 
the Court's power to decide the underlying constitutional issue, and the label 
sovereign immunity is applied whenever the Court decides that the state defendants 
have not acted unconstitutionally. 
•• See Davis, supra note 35, at 3-8. 
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challenged action was not unconstitutional or ultra vires but simply 
illegal under general law,S0 but these federal cases were later 
overruled or distinguished, and the doctrines applied to the states 
and the federal government came closely together again in Larson v. 
Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp. 51 
In Larson the plaintiff corporation had entered into a contract 
with the War Assets Administration, a federal agency, for the 
delivery of coal. When the corporation failed to deposit funds in 
advance payment, as the agency deemed to be required by the 
contract,S2 the government cancelled the contract. The corporation 
then commenced its suit asking that the contract be declared binding 
and that Larson, as the agency's administrator, be enjoined from 
selling or delivering the coal to any other buyer. Larson invoked the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in an attempt to bar the suit. 53 
The Court54 proceeded to discuss the sovereign immunity issue 
in a two-step analysis. First, the Court followed long-accepted 
holdings55 in ruling that the suit, though nominally against an 
individual, is actually one against the United States if the request for 
relief would run against the government's property or funds or would 
affect the officer in the exercise of his official functions. 56 This part of 
'"See, e.g., Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926),.criticized in Larson v. Domestic 
and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 699-702 (1949). Insofar as Goltra may 
have embodied some respect for state or general law as controlling the federal 
government, cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 935 ('II 5), those ideas have 
been eroded by more recent developments that recognize the need for the federal 
bureaucracy to act without undue hindrance in attending to problems of a national 
nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. ll I (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947) (preemption 
notions). 
51 337 u.s. 682 (1949). 
'
1 The corporation had posted a letter of credit instead of the equivalent amount 
in cash. !d. at 685. 
, !d. at 684-86. 
" Some commentators have remarked that the Larson opinion, so often relied 
upon, was only a minority position. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 31, at 405 n.73. 
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion, however, is clearly labeled that "of the Court," and 
Justice Douglas' short concurring statement plainly declares that "I have joined the 
Court's opinion." 337 U.S. at 705. Justice Rutledge concurred only in the result, while 
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented. 
"The Court cited In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), and Minnesota v. Hitchock, 
185 U.S. 373 (1902). 337 U.S. at 687 n.6. 
"337 U.S. at 687-88. This is the so-called "general rule." Cramton, supra note 31, 
at416. 
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the inquiry is little more than a perfunctory question. Because the 
government can act only through its officers and agents,S7 virtually 
every action against an officer will be in effect a suit against the 
sovereign. Only when the plaintiff requests damages from an 
individual defendant58 or when the suit is against the person for 
activities totally extraneous from his official duties59 is the 
government not implicated. 
The second prong of the Court's analysis carved two major 
exceptions to the first test. Even if the initial inquiry indicates that 
the immunity doctrine should apply, said the Court, the suit still does 
not involve the sovereign if the officer's official actions were not 
those sanctioned by the government, that is, if his actions exceeded 
his authority or if they violated the Constitution. In such situations 
the "officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has 
empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign 
has forbidden."60 Although the Court chose words which carry the 
quaint ring of agency law, the phrasing suggests real considerations. 
The government cares only that legally and constitutionally 
mandated activities are carried out. When a court enjoins official 
actions that are ultra vires or unconstitutional, there is no 
interference with legitimate governmental operations.61 
Applying this analysis to the case before it, the Larson Court 
found that the suit should properly be characterized as one against 
the United States since a decree would affect the War Assets 
Administration's coal delivery program.62 The Court further held 
that the exceptions to the rule did not apply because the corporate 
buyers had not alleged that Larson's actions in revoking the contract 
57 Cramton, supra note 31, at4l0-ll; but see Rockbridge v. Lincoln,449 F.2d 567, 
573 (9th Cir. 1971). 
"See, e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Only Jaw 
enforcement officers and other low-level officials appear to bear the burden of their 
individual misconduct. Higher officials are usually protected by a judicially created 
"official immunity." See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor); Barr v. 
Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Sittenfield v. Tobringer, 459 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(zoning officials). 
"The Larson Court suggested as an example an officer's sale of his personal 
home. 337 U.S. at 689. 
60 337 U.S. at 689. 
61 !d. at 689-90. Protection from undue interference ..yith government funds and 
operations is the only basis for the immunity doctrine that is still seriously urged. See 
id. at 704; Block, supra note 35, at 1061; cf pp. 360-63 infra. 
62 337 U.S. at 703. 
334 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10 
were unconstitutional or ultra vires.63 The plaintiffs arg.ued that 
pfficial action that was illegal under general law also warranted an 
exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, but this contention 
was pointedly rejected.64 Attempting to wipe out all prior ambiguities 
in the law, the Court tortuously reinterpreted most of its prior 
decisions to fit them into the categories of ultra vires or 
unconstitutional action.65 Cases not admitting such a reading were 
disapproved.66 The finely drawn line between mere illegality and ultra 
vires actions left a foreboding flaw to which we shall soon return.67 
The Larson ruling quickly took hold. Only five years after the 
decision, Professor Davis was able to state that the Larson exceptions 
were the "outstanding generalization" dominating the case law of 
sovereign immunity.68 Since 1949 the Court has only twice given full 
consideration to the federal sovereign immunity issue, and each time 
it unanimously reaffirmed the approach adopted by a bare five-
member majority in Larson. 69 Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in 
Dugan v. Rank10 sets out the rules most succinctly. After noting that 
the sovereign immunity doctrine applies when the suit against an 
officer is in reality against the government, he reiterates that there are 
exceptions: 
Those exceptions are (I) action by officers beyond their 
statutory powers and (2) even though within the scope of 
61 !d. at 691, 703. Sovereign immunity may be waived by statute, Canadian 
Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945), and the Court suggested that the 
corporation's remedy against the government could be pursued under such a statutory 
waiver in the Court of Claims. 337 U.S. at 703 n.27. 
•• 337 U.S. at 692, 699-702. The plaintifrs argument was that official action 
constituting a common law tort was "illegal" as a matter of general law, would not be 
authorized by statute, and thus could not be shielded by sovereign immunity. See 
p. 332 and note 56 supra. 
65 337 U.S. at 693-700. On whether the rereadings were labored, see Justice 
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, 337 U.S. at 716-32. 
66 /d. at 699-702. Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926) was the only case 
specifically disapproved, but there were undoubtedly others. See 331 U.S. at 716-32 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
"See pp. 340-41 infra. 
" Davis, supra note 35, at 8. 
•• See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) and its companion case, City of Fresno 
v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). In 1963, 
the Court filed a two-paragraph per curiam order which dismissed an action in its 
original jurisdiction without discussing the Larson-Dugan exceptions. Hawaii v. 
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963). Cf. Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 
299 (1952) (eleventh amendment). 
70 372 u.s. 609 (1963). 
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their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in 
which they are exercised are constitutionally void .... In 
either of such cases the officer's action "can be made the 
basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an 
individual .... " 71 
2. Recent Cases in the Courts of Appeals 
335 
The very settled nature of the Larson-Dugan exceptions to 
sovereign immunity is illustrated by the great number of recent Court 
of Appeals decisions outside the employment area where the courts 
have found little difficulty in applying the Supreme Court's 
standards. A survey of the 28 instances since 196972 in which federal 
sovereign immunity was considered shows 18 suits in which the 
Larson-Dugan formulations were noted73 and the defense of 
immunity overruled.74 The suits ranged from attempts to stop a 
"/d. at 621-33. The Court has not always pressed the technical requirement that 
the official be sued in his personal capacity. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 n.8 (1949); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349 
(1939). 
"The period surveyed covers those cases decided since 1969, the year in which 
sovereign immunity was first applied to bar federal employment discrimination cases. 
See note 20 supra. Those cases in which courts found a statutory waiver of immunity, 
e.g .• Romeo v. United States, 462 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 
(1973), or proceeded to the merits and dismissed on the merits rather than on 
sovereign immunity grounds, e.g., Reece v. United States, 455 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972) 
have been excluded. 
"We are not here concerned with whether the Larson-Dugan principles were 
correctly applied in the circumstances of each case, but only with whether the courts 
understood what principles they were to use in deciding sovereign immunity cases. 
" Eight cases find that the doctrine did not apply because the officer's acts were 
unconstitutional. States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (4th Cir. 
1974); Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
949 (1974); Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3rd. Cir. 1972) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (in suit to require disclosure of CIA funding, no sovereign 
immunity because alleged failure to disclose violates article I,§ 9 of the Constitution); 
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731,735 (7th Cir. 1971); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 
422, 428-29 (lOth Cir. 1971); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 493 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (per Bazelon, C.J.) (no sovereign immunity where defendant had acted 
unconstitutionally and without authority in keeping fingerprints of innocent 
individuals in FBI files); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 869 (1971); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. White, 418 F.2d 1126, 
1129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (panel including Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger). 
Ten cases hold that the officers exceeded their authority. See Schlafly v. Volpe, 
495 F.2d 273, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1974); Association of N.W. Stee1headers v. United 
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racially discriminatory federal housing program75 to a test of the 
constitutionality of the Vietnam War.76 In the other ten cases decided 
since 1969, the Larson-Dugan exceptions were noted but held 
inapplicable. In each of these decisions the Court ruled that the 
federal official had acted within the scope of his authority and that 
the action was not unconstitutional. 77 
During this period, however, courts faced with federal em-
ployment discrimination claims failed to apply the Larson-Dugan 
exceptions in considering the sovereign immunity defense.78 Each of 
these cases involved racial or ethnic discrimination which is 
unquestionably unconstitutiona1,'9 and yet in each case the court 
ruled in favor of at least partial sovereign immunity. We turn to 
those cases to find out what went wrong. 
States Army Corps of Engineers, 485 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1973); State Highway 
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. 
Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 654-55 {lOth Cir. 1971); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 
573-74 (9th Cir. 1971); Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington,448 F.2d 1045, 1052-
53 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 596-98 (3rd Cir. 
1971); Armstrong v. Udall, 435 F.2d 38,40 (9th Cir. 1970); Andros v. Rupp, 433 F.2d 
70,72-73 (9th Cir. 1970); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1313-16 (9th Cir. 1969). 
u Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731,735 (7th Cir. 1971). 
76 Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). The 
court ruled that although the claim may be nonjusticiable, sovereign immunity did not 
apply because the plaintiff alleged that the war was unconstitutional. /d. at 306. 
77 See Essex v. Vinal, 499 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1974) (acceptance of taxes held 
"illegal" but not ultra vires; therefore, remedy in court of claims); Junior Chamber of 
Commerce v. U.S. Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883, 889 (lOth Cir. 1974) (tax officials acting 
within authority and not unconstitutionally in granting tax exemption); National 
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1000 (lOth Cir. 1973); National Indian Youth 
Council v. Bruce, 485 F.2d 97, 99 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 946 (1974) 
(Bureau of Indian Affairs said to be acting within discretion in operating all-Indian 
Schools); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1051-54 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 920 (1974); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608,610 (lOth Cir. 1971)(storageof 
chemical warfare materials at Rocky Mountain Arsenal authorized by law); Scholder 
v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); 
Colson v. Hickel, 428 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 
(1971); Blake Constr. Co. v. American Vocational Ass'n Inc., 419 F.2d 308, 312-13 
(D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Knight v. New York,443 F.2d 415,419-21 (2d Cir. l97l)(Larson-
Dugan rules in eleventh amendment context). 
71 See p. 327 supra. Additionally, one maverick Fourth Circuit decision ruled 
out the defense simply because it felt that judgment against the United States would 
have insignificant impact on the government. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 
1214 (4th Cir. 1971). 
"See cases cited in notes 15 & 19 supra. 
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B. Federal Employment Discrimination Cases 
Those federal employment cases recognizing an expanded 
sovereign immunity defense may be traced back to a common origin, 
Judge (now Justice) Blackmon's opinion for the Eighth Circuit in 
Gnotta v. United States. 80 In that case a federal civil servant sued his 
supervisor and others, alleging that they had denied him advanced 
training and job promotion solely because of his Italian ancestry. 
Although such discrimination in this context was certainly uncon-
stitutional81 and demanded application of the Larson-Dugan 
exceptions, the court nevertheless ruled that· sovereign immunity 
barred Gnotta's suit. 
Although the Gnotta opinion has been in circulation for only 
five years, it has attracted two very important adherents. In Ogletree 
v. McNamara82 the Sixth Circuit briefly adverted to Gnotta and then 
found that sovereign immunity barred black civilian employees' 
claims that the Air Force's hiring, promotion, and complaint 
procedures were unconstitutionally discriminatory.83 The Fifth 
Circuit, in Blaze v. Moon, 84 dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds 
a federal employee's suit alleging unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination in hiring by the Corps of Engineers. ss The Fifth Circuit 
•• 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1970). 
"See note 19 supra. Such discrimination could be justified only upon a showing 
of a compelling governmental interest in maintaining the discrimination. See 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Hyrabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81 (1943). There is no intimation in the Gnotta opinion that the plaintifrs position 
involved national security or that the government had any particular interest which 
has been suggested as compelling in other contexts. See Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); Hyrabayashi v. United States, supra; cf Lee v. Washington, 
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam). 
"449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971). 
" The Sixth Circuit later faced two additional cases in which it invoked sovereign 
immunity to bar federal employment suits. See Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th 
Cir.}, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.}, 
cert denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974): It is unclear from the Bramblett opinion whether the 
employee's discharge was merely arbitrary or unconstitutional; the Larson-Dugan 
exceptions would apply only in the latter sitution. In any event, the court's cursory 
dismissal of the case without any inquiry into the scope of the officer's authority or the 
constitutionality of his action shows a continuing misunderstanding of sovereign 
immunity principles. 
"440 F.2a 1348 (5th Cir. 1971). 
" Blaze charged that the agency hired blacks in part-time and unclassified 
positions while hiring whites for high paying jobs. While one set of Justice Depart-
ment attorneys in the South was arguing that such practices could not be challenged 
due to the sovereign immunity doctrine, another set of government attorneys was 
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also followed Gnotta in Beale v. Blount, 86 but here the court began to 
limit its obedience. Although a fired postal employee's request for an 
injunction encountered the immunity obstacle, the panel decided 
that relief in the nature of mandamus was a proper exception to 
the doctrine.87 
The Ogletree and Blaze opinions merely adopted the Gnotta 
holding without examination and therefore add little to its analysis. 
Beale v. Blount, however, began to retreat from absolute immunity, 
and its attempt to limit the Gnotta rationale has attracted support 
from the Ninth Circuit.88 A comparison of Beale and Gnotta will 
illustrate how the courts' analytical problems began and how they 
are beginning to solve those problems. 
I. Gnotta v. United States89 
Judge Blackmun's opinion in Gnotta is no model of clarity. 
Discussing the merits of the case at the outset but turning to the 
sovereign immunity issue when the merits begin to show difficulty, 
his writing leaves somewhat unclear whether he considers Gnotta's 
charge of discrimination to be unfounded or simply irrelevant to the 
immunity issue.90 A charitable reading of the opinion might 
characterize the case as one where ethnic discrimination was claimed 
but not proved/1 
prosecuting the state of Alabama for having followed similar practices in its hiring and 
promotion. See United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
"461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). 
17 Beale required, however, that the plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to the mandamus action. 461 F.2d at 1138-40. The Beale trend away from 
a strict Gnotta-type view of sovereign immunity was followed and expanded in Penn v. 
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en 
bane), which was in turn cited and followed in Petterway v. Veteran's Adm'n Hosp., 
495 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1974). See p. 344 infra. Penn's reversal en bane has cast a 
cloud on its more enlightened holding, and therefore upon Petterway as well. 
Although the Penn reversal was technically for failure to exhaust remedies, the issues 
which apparently concerned the Court closely parallel sovereign immunity 
considerations-namely the respect for executive discretion in hiring and promotion 
of employees. Cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971). 
"See Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). 
"415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970). 
90 415 F.2d at 1274-75. 
91 The record showed that Mr. Gnotta had carried his claim through 
administrative appeals and that each level had ruled against his claim, including the 
Civil Service Commission. 415 F.2d at 1275. "One is inclined," wrote Judge 
Blackmun, "initially and on the face of plaintiff Gnotta's testimony at the 
administrative hearing, to have a measure of sym~athy for him for he is, in a sense, 
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Yet such a reading of Gnotta cannot be seriously maintained. 
Judge Blackmun pointedly observes that "we could" and "we might" 
decide the case by ruling on the factual issue of whether 
discrimination was proved, but he decides that the sovereign 
immunity question comes first.92 Thus we must turn to a second 
reading of Gnotta-that it found sovereign immunity to apply even 
where it is alleged that officers had acted unconstitutionally and in 
excess of their authority. 
This reading of Gnotta still leaves the case extremely puzzling, 
however, for Judge Blackmun did not wholly ignore the Larson-
Dugan exceptions to sovereign immunity. In a one-sentence 
acknowledgment of Supreme Court authority, the opinion suc-
cinctly states: 
This obviously is not a case which concerns either of the 
exceptions recognized in Dugan v. Rank, ... namely, where 
the officer's act is beyond his statutory power or where, 
although the action is within the scope of his authority, the 
power, or the manner of its exercise, is constitutionally void. 
See Simons v. Vinson.93 
There is no discussion why the case so "obviously" fell outside the 
Larson-Dugan exceptions. Nor does the reference to Simons v. 
Vinson94 immediately enlighten us. That was a suit to quiet title where 
the claim of an ultra vires taking was based upon the unwarranted 
assumption that the United States did not own the land. The case 
was apparently cited only as a general reference to the rule that where 
official action is not ultra vires or unconstitutional, immunity will 
attach. 
How then can ws; explain why Judge Blackmun thought the 
Larson-Dugan exceptions inapplicable? A careful reading of the 
opinion shows that the possible unconstitutionality of the defend-
ants' actions is not in the minds of the judges. Although the relevant 
Executive Order95 is discussed at great length, there is no hint of a 
constitutional cause of action. Indeed, Gnotta's petition for 
"bucking the establishment" or what seems to him to be an inflexible employment 
hierarchy .... Contrastingly, one must note that the plaintiff chose to be sensitive 
about, rather than to assert rightful pride in, his Italian ancestry." Id. 
92 415 F.2d at 1276. 
•• 415 F.2d at 1277 (citations omitted). 
•• 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968) . 
• , Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). It was substantially identical 
to current Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969). 
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certiorari in the Supreme Court reveals that he did not seek review 
based on a substantive violation of the fifth amendment's due 
process clause.96 
Since Gnotta had not based his cause of action on the 
Constitution, the only applicable Larson-Dugan exception would be 
the ultra vires action formula. This interpretation of the court's 
understanding of the case also explains why Judge Blackmun cited an 
unrelated land title case such as Simons v. Vinson97 to support his 
ruling that the exceptions were not present-in that case the ultra 
vires approach rather than the unconstitutional action argument had 
been pressed and rejected.98 
With this understanding of the case, one can begin to see the 
outlines of an argument that would have supported Judge Black-
mun's bald assertion that no sovereign immunity exception applied 
to Gnotta's claim. It would build upon one of the inherent 
weaknesses in Larson-the problem of drawing the dividing line 
between activity which is merely "illegal" and that which is in excess 
of authority or done without authority.99 The Gnotta court may have 
felt that since the supervisor had general authority to promote 
personnel, any discrimination he practiced was merely illegal, a 
mistake of law, and not outside his authority. 100 Even though the 
court may have erred in this determination, such an analysis is at 
least founded on the Larson-Dugan framework. 101 
"Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Gnotta v. United States, 397 U.S. 934 
(1970), denying cert. to 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969). H!! instead wove an intricate 
argument relying upon the executive order to create a substantive right from which the 
court would imply a cause of action. !d. at 7, citing Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409 (1968). See415 F.2d at 1278-79. 
91 See quotation at p. 339 supra. 
"See note 96 supra. 
99 See p. 332 & note 50; p. 334 supra. 
'""The court emphasized that promotion decisions involve the exercise of 
administrative discretion not normally subject to judicial review. 415 F.2d at 1276-77. 
101 The counterargument would stress that the supervisor is denied authority by 
the specific executive order to allow discriminatory intent to influence his decisions. 
Denied such authority to discriminate, he acts ultra vires in q~aking national ancestry 
the basis of his decision. See Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703, rev'd on other 
grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). The tension between the two lines of 
argument is illustrated in another context by the majority and the dissent in Sierra Club 
v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973). 
As to whether the ultra vires argument was properly applied in Gnotta itself, it is 
interesting to note that Solicitor General Griswold expressly refused to rely on the 
sovereign immunity argument when the Supreme Court considered the case. 
Memorandum for the Respondents in Opposition, Gnotta v. United States, 397 U.S. 
934 (1970), denying cert. to 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969). See also note 100 supra. 
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2. Beale v. Blount102 
Whether one takes the uncharitable view that Gnotta was simply 
wrong in ruling out the Larson-Dugan exceptions or the more 
realistic view that the court did not have before it the uncon-
stitutional action argument, it is clear that the Gnotta decision should 
have had no force in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases that followed 
it. 103 In each of those cases the black employees involved specifically 
stated their claims in terms of illegalities of constitutional 
proportion.104 Although the Fifth Circuit started out with an easy per 
curiam adoption of the Gnotta precedent, 105 a subsequent panel soon 
realized that something was seriously amiss in the Gnotta-inspired 
superstructure. Still erroneously reading the case to control suits 
alleging constitutional wrongs, the second panel began in Beale v. 
Blount106 to carve out exceptions of an order other than those 
mentioned in Larson. Though the court's sense of uneasiness with 
Gnotta was correct, its solution was wrong. 
Beale alleged that his discharge by the United States Post Office 
was racially motivated, claiming that local postal officials provoked 
him to violence and then handed him sterner punishment than was 
imposed on white employees. Although he had at first requested 
damages, this prayer was dropped, and the only relief at issue was his 
request for reinstatement and general injunctive relief.107 
The district court had dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, but the court of appeals chose to face the 
sovereign immunity issue first. 108 Searching for a way to limit the 
Gnotta holding, the court manufactured a distinction between 
personal reinstatement and other injunctive relief. In three brief 
'"' 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). 
'"'See notes 20-22 supra. Claims under42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), see note 29 supra, 
are also constitutionally based, deriving from Congress' power to define badges of 
slavery violative of the thirteenth amendment. Cf Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409,437-44 (1968). Official action in violation of§ 1981 may also be considered ultra 
vires the officer's authority. See Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other 
grounds, 491 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). 
'"'Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 702, rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 970 
(5th Cir. 1974); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348, 1349 (5th Cir. 1971); Ogletree v. 
McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1971); see Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1136 
(5th Cir. 1972) (invoking civil rights statutes which enforce constitutional rights). 
'"'Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971). 
106 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). 
107 !d. at 1135-37 & n.2. 
••• /d. at 113. 
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paragraphs directing us to no authorities other than Gnotta and the 
circuit's prior decision, which had cited only Gnotta, 109 the panel first 
held that the "request for injunctive relief against the defendants' 
allegedly racially discriminatory practices" was barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 110 However, the court then declared 
that mandamus for reinstatement traditionally "has been regarded as 
an exception to the doctrine that suits may not be maintained against 
the United States without its consent."111 The panel decided that 
although the plaintiff had requested "injunctive relief' which it 
found barred by the immunity doctrine, his request for reinstatement 
would be treated as a petition for a "mandatory injunction" or 
mandamus. 112 Said the court, "This by-passes the obstacle of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity .... " 113 
The court was not entirely without citation to support its 
argument that mandamus is an independent exception to the 
sovereign immunity doctrine. But the sole case on which it relied, 
Clackamas County v. McKay,l 14 is not authority for such a prop-
osition. After a lengthy discussion of the uses of mandamus and the 
sovereign immunity exceptions that had been only recently reviewed 
in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 115 the McKay 
court explicitly held that a "non-discretionary act required of an 
official falls within the exception stated in the Larson case ... relating 
to acts without authority." 116 
'"'Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971), was the case. Only Judge 
Coleman sat on both the Blaze and Beale panels. 
110 461 F.2d at 1137 (emphasis added). 
111 /d. at 1137. The court ignored the fact that Gnotta, which it had just found 
controlling on the injunctive relief issue, had also rejected mandamus as a basis for 
relief. See415 F.2d at 1273. 
111 461 F.2d at 1137, 1138. Of course, the writ of mandamus has been abolished in 
federal district courts in favor of the unitary civil action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8l(b). 
Relief in the nature of mandamus is still available, however, upon the grounds for 
which mandamus was previously granted./d.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Mandamus 
will issue to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty imposed upon him by law. 
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). While it is often said that 
mandamus cannot control discretionary decisions, that somewhat overstates the 
matter. If an officer has discretion within limits mandamus may be used to confine his 
decisions to those limits setting aside those made outside his discretion. See, e.g., 
Work v. United States ex ref. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1925). See generally Byse 
& Fiocca, Section /36/ of the Mandamus and Venue Act of /962 and "Nonstatutory" 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967). 
m 461 F.2d at 1138. 
'" 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). 
Ill 337 u.s. 682 (1949). 
"' 219 F.2d at 493 (emphasis added). Mandamus cases fall within the Larson-
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What the Beale court saw in McKay, therefore, was not a special 
sovereign immunity rule for mandamus but rather a reflection of the 
general rules expressed in Larson. Adoption of mandamus as an 
exception to sovereign immunity surely accomplished the Beale 
court's diplomatic need to respect a prior Fifth Circuit precedent 
adopting Gnotta. But the diplomatic victory was costly: the narrow 
relief of reinstatement was allowed, but injunctive relief, which is just 
as permissible under Larson as reinstatement, was unjustly banned. 
Thus Beale, although a step in the right direction, clings 
unnecessarily to Gnotta and thus perpetuates an error that could 
have serious con.sequences in a case where the mandamus remedy 
would not lie but where injunctive relief would, except for the Beale-
Gnotta bar, be available. 117 The shortest route out of this forest is 
back to the established rules: where plaintiffs contend that federal 
officers have acted unconstitutionally, the first of the Larson-Dugan 
exceptions clearly applies, and the suit, regardless of its jurisdictional 
basis, may not be construed as one against the United States.118 
3. Recent Case Developments 
While the Sixth Circuit has only recently reaffirmed its 
commitment to the sovereign immunity doctrine in employment 
cases, 119 recent decisions in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits indicate that 
Dugan exceptions because in each case the official is alleged to have acted contrary to 
his authority in refusing to undertake the required activity. See Menard v. Mitchell, 
430 F.2d 486,493 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 
427 F.2d 561, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also note 112 supra. In fact, sovereign 
immunity can be a successful defense in a mandamus action. Where mandamus does 
not lie because the challenged official action is discretionary, the court may dispose of 
the case on sovereign immunity grounds. See McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (lOth 
Cir. 1971); White v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. Adm'n, 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 
1965); Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70 (lOth Cir. 1964). See generally Byse, 
Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Soveriegn Immunity, 
Indispensable Parties Mandamus, 15 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962). 
117 Cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (discrimination in site 
selection and housing construction; decision to build discretionary). But see note 112 
supra. 
"'See p. 335 supra. The case is ordinarily now ready for trial. See Menard v. 
Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971}, on remand from 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 
1970); Land v. Dollar, 82 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd, 184 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 
1950}, on remand from 330 U.S. 731 (1947). 
1
" See note 21 supra. 
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the courts may well be moving back to the basic Larson-Dugan 
position. The Fifth Circuit has continued its retreat from Gnotta in 
Penn v. Schlesinger. 120 There, black federal employees, suing on 
behalf of themselves and similarly situated blacks in Alabama, 
alleged that 17 federal agencies in the state maintained racially 
discriminatory promotion and advancement practices. Plaintiffs 
based one cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1981.121 The court first held 
the mandamus exception of Beale122 to be applicable. 123 It further held 
that the Larson-Dugan exceptions were applicable and that a 
violation of Section 1981 by a federal official was an ultra vires act, 
court consideration of which was not barred by sovereign 
immunity.J24 Thus in Penn, the court both retained its allegiance to 
the circuit's Gnotta-type precedents and returned to the Larson-
Dugan exceptions. 125 As we noted earlier, 126 mandamus as an 
exception to sovereign immunity is merely one example of the 
Larson-Dugan rules as applied. The practical result of the Penn 
decision, therefore, is to reinstate the Larson-Dugan exceptions, with 
mandamus getting "double coverage." 127 
One other recent decision should also be noted. The Ninth 
Circuit, in Bowers v. Campbell, 128 faced the issue of sovereign 
immunity in federal employment discrimination suits for the first 
time. Significantly, the court ignored Gnotta and simply held the 
Larson-Dugan exception applicable. 129 The court did cite Beale v. 
Blount for the proposition that sovereign immunity may limit the 
110 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts •.• as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " In Sanders v. Dobbs Houses 
Inc., 43 I F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971), the Fifth Circuit 
held that Section 1981 provided a cause of action against private employment 
discrimination. In the instant case, the court extended that holding to discriminatory 
acts by federal officials. 490 F.2d at 702. 
m See pp. 341-42 supra. 
111 490 F.2d at 701. 
11
'/d. at 703-04. 
111 /d. at 704-05. The en bane reversal, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), was solely_on 
the grounds of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
126 See pp. 342-43 supra. 
m See Petterway v. Veterans Adm'n Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1974). 
ua 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). 
119 /d. at 1158. The court found that racially discriminatory employment decisions 
by federal officials were ultra vires their authority as limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1970). 
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relief to which the plaintiff would ultimately be entitled, 130 but it 
appeared to defer the relief issue until after trial.131 
In short, recent developments suggest that Gnotta's per-
suasiveness in other circuit courts is waning. The Larson-Dugan rules 
are being reasserted to allow federal employees to obtain a trial on 
their claims of racial discrimination. This return to basic concepts 
will, in most suits, end all talk of sovereign immunity. Yet Penn and 
Bowers, pursuing what was only implied in Beale, 132 realized that 
specific relief orders may create a second set of sovereign immunity 
problems. In this area there are no clear rules of the Larson-Dugan 
type to guide courts. Indeed, as we shall see, the courts are searching 
for standards to define what role sovereign immunity should play in 
determining relief for plaintiffs who are successful in establishing 
federal employment discrimination. 
Since there is a search for standards in this area, the next part of 
the Article will turn away from employment discrimination cases to a 
more general consideration of the interests that underlie sovereign 
immunity. Finding those interests to be the separate constitutional 
powers of the branches of the federal government, we shall show how 
a separation of powers analysis provides the best standards for 
considering relief issues that arise under the label of sovereign 
immunity. 
II. SEPARATING THE JURISDICTIONAL AND RELIEF 
ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
A. The Precedents 
We saw above that recent employment discrimination cases 
have begun to separate two distinct issues often merged in sovereign 
immunity analysis133-jurisdiction to entertain the suit and power to 
grant certain kinds of relief. The Larson-Dugan exceptions respond 
only to the first of these issues; if the complaint fails to claim that the 
challenged action falls outside the officers' constitutional or 
statutory authority, the court is without jurisdiction to hear the suit. 
But even if the exceptions apply to give the court jurisdiction to hear 
130 505 F.2d at 1158. 
'" ld. Cf. Petterway v. Veterans Adm'n Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
"'See pp. 341-42supra. 
"' See pp. 343-44 supra. 
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the claim, the court might nevertheless be barred by sovereign 
immunity considerations from granting certain types of relief. 
The Larson court itself suggested in a footnote that the form of 
relief could intrude upon legitimate interests of the sovereign: 
Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even 
if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted 
unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the 
relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the 
cessation of the conduct complained of but will require 
affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of 
unquestionably sovereign property. North Carolina v. 
Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).' 34 
While it is true that cases predating Larson often merged the 
jurisdictional and relief aspects of sovereign immunity, 135 modern 
Supreme Court cases have recognized the separation. In a recent 
decision involving state sovereign immunity, 136 Edelman v. Jordan, 137 
the Court made this distinction explicit. The case challenged the 
constitutionality of state administration of a joint federal-state 
welfare program. The court of appeals ruled that the defendant 
officials' actions were inconsistent with overriding federal law and 
therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.138 The court 
reasoned that once the sovereign immunity hurdle has been cleared 
by a finding of unconstitutional action, both prospective injunctive 
relief and retroactive welfare payments were available as remedies. 139 
The Supreme Court disagreed on the retroactive payments issue. In 
an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that while federal 
courts have the power to require the states to run their programs 
111 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11 
(1949). 
111 See, e.g .• North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890); Noble v. Union R.L. 
Ry., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). These cases can be explained by the slow evolution of 
sovereign immunity rules, see pp. 329-35 supra, and traditional American civil 
procedure's merging of the concepts of cause of action and relief. See R. Field & B. 
Kaplan, CIVIL PROCEDURE 216-30, 261-75, 306-13 (temp. 2d ed. 1968) (collecting 
English and American sources). 
uo U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
llJ 415 u.s. 651 (1974). 
111 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973). 
"'/d. at 990-95. The court admitted that on certain occasions equitable relief 
would be unavailable, but it associated these occasions with the nature and status of 
the parties rather than with the relief power itself. See id. at 992 (nonresident suits 
under state-created causes of action). 
1975] Sovereign Immunity 347 
constitutionally or not at all in the future, they have no power, 140 
because of the sovereign immunity doctrine, to order retroactive 
payments from the state treasury .141 
The distinction between the jurisdictional and relief aspects of 
sovereign immunity has important practical ramifications. On the 
one hand, once the separation is acknowledged, judicial reluctance to 
grant any specific relief requested can no longer serve to bar the 
plaintifPs entire suit. 142 On the other hand, recognition of a second 
stage of sovereign immunity analysis means that there may remain at 
the relief stage a legitimate role for some governmental interests 
rebuked at the Larson-Dugan level of analysis, such as the executive's 
asserted interest in controlling its own employment practices.143 
Finally, in those cases where some legitimate governmental interests 
are recognized at the relief stage, courts will have to face the difficult 
task of formulating relief which will clearly protect the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights without interfering in protected governmental 
functions. 
B. Current Approaches to the Relief Issue 
Even after the separate nature of the relief issue is established, 
there remains the difficult problem of determining the circumstances 
in which sovereign immunity may be utilized to bar relief. Whereas 
••• 415 U.S. 663-64. The Court adhered to the verbal formulation that eleventh 
amendment sovereign immunity "partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar." /d. at 
678. This does not indicate a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit-
the case had been tried already and partial relief given. Rather the jurisdictional issue 
here is Jack of jurisdiction-power-to order the relief described by the Court. 
"' Two recent Second Circuit cases illustrate how the lower courts have managed 
to separate jurisdictional and relief aspects of sovereign immunity. In both cases the 
court allowed the suit alleging unconstitutional action to be brought but ruled that 
certain kinds of relief violated- sovereign immunity principles. See Rothstein v. 
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Sostre v. 
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane) (injunctive relief permitted, damages 
refused). 
"' Of course, where the plaintiff limits himself to asking for relief which is known 
to be barred, it is an empty gesture to permit a full trial. That will usually not be the 
case, however. See cases cited in note 141 supra. 
"' Although Gnotta and the cases which followed it were decided on sovereign 
immunity grounds, it is apparent that the courts were more concerned with the power 
of the executive branch to control its employment practio;es without court interference. 
See Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d at 1276-77; Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 
99-100 (6th Cir. 1971); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 707 (dissenting opinion), 
adopted 491 F.2d 970 (1974) (en bane). 
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the Larson-Dugan exceptions are easily, almost mechanically applied, 
there is no consensus over what test should be used to decide 
sovereign immunity issues at the relief stage of a suit. Court decisions 
suggest various approaches to dealing with this critical problem. 
1. An Intolerable Burden Test 
One approach has been to return to Larson's footnote eleven, 
where the Court observed that a suit may fail, even after clearing the 
initial sovereign immunity hurdles, if the relief requested would 
require affirmative action by the sovereign or disposition of 
government property .144 
Courts discussing footnote eleven have emphasized the word 
"may" to show that in such a situation the suit need not necessarily 
fail, but simply may fail. They point out that reading the footnote 
broadly to outlaw every injunction interfering with government 
programs would render meaningless the Larson text's dual excep-
tions to the immunity doctrine. 145 This view is supported by the text 
of the Court's opinion in Larson, which suggests that not all 
affirmative relief is forbidden. The Court cites approvingly several 
cases in which the defendant was ordered to take action in his official 
capacity}46 Mandamus cases further attest to the fact that affirmative 
relief does not automatically raise the bar of sovereign immunity. 147 
As a guideline for what is included within the "may" of footnote 
eleven, several courts have suggested an "intolerable burden" test. 
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Schlafly v. Volpe_, 148 an im-
poundment case, is a recent example. In that case the Secretary 
of Transportation had allegedly exceeded his authority in 
impounding certain highway trust funds from distribution to the 
states, and thus the Larson-Dugan exception for ultra vires acts 
erased sovereign immunity as a defense to the hearing of the suit. 149 
"' 337 U.S. at 691 n.l I. The footnote is set out in full at p. 346supra. 
~<l See, e.g., Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1969); Turner v. 
King's River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1966). 
146 Most important in this regard is the Court's reference to habeas corpus, where 
defendant jailors, who held prisoners only by virtue of an official duty, are ordered to 
release the prisoner. 337 U.S. at 690. 
1
" Compare United States ex ref. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913), with 
Clackamus County, Ore. v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 
349 u.s. 909 (1955). 
141 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974). 
1
" !d. at 278-79. 
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Nevertheless, since the plaintiff requested that the Secretary be 
ordered to release the improperly impounded funds, the court was 
faced with footnote eleven's warning that such affirmative relief 
"may" violate sovereign immunity.150 The "intolerable burden" test 
adopted by the court gives content to the "may" with a forseeability 
test-determining what action the government probably would have 
taken absent the defendant official's ultra vires action. If the 
requested relief asks approximately for what was statutorily required 
but not executed, then the intrusion upon legitimate governmental 
interests is apparently judged tolerable, lSI at least when compared to 
the harm done to the plaintiffs if no relief is granted.152 
The intolerable burden test is quite attractive in that it 
functionally seeks to identify the legitimate governmental interests 
that might be harmed by granting relief. The foreseeability aspect of 
the inquiry, however, is useful only in cases where ultra vires action 
has been found, for in such cases the offending officials are 
interjecting only their personal (albeit policy-based) interest in 
subverting Congress' command. The government's interest is simply 
assumed to be that established in the legislation, and therefore 
judicially requiring the offical to act as Congress directed by 
tautology imposes no "intolerable burden" on governmental 
operations.153 
Where unconstitutional action is at issue, however, the burden 
test becomes wholly subjective because the court has no standards to 
guide its determination of tolerability. For example, does an order 
requiring that a class of unconstitutionally discharged employees be 
given back pay totaling several million dollars impose an intolerable 
burden? Here the government has a fiscal interest entirely distinct 
"" /d. at 279-80. 
"' /d. at 280. In the impoundment situation, the Schlajly court notes that but for 
the Secretary's action the funds sought would have been disbursed as required by 
Congress. Thus, the requested affirmative relief-ordering the release of funds-
would burden the government fisc '"only to the extent that Congress has already 
authorized ... .'" /d .• quoting State Highway Comm'n. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123, 
rehearing denied, 479 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1973). 
"'The Schlajly court suggests that the intolerable burden test is an equitable 
balancing act, measuring whether the relief order's burden on governmental functions 
outweighs private harm. 495 F.2d at 280. Yet since the court finds the burden in the 
case before it negligible, it does not face the question of whether a private harm might 
ever be so great as to justify a considerable burden on government activities, and thus 
we cannot be sure that the equitable balancing is meant as a serious aspect of the 
intolerable burden test. Cf Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969). 
"'See, e.g .• Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273,280 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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from its legislated interest in having an officer carry out his duties, 
and certainly any court order in this area would interfere with the 
former interest to some degree. But what degree of interference 
creates an "intolerable" burden? Nor do the foreseeability aspects of 
the burden test lead us out of this subjective inquiry. It is, of course, 
evident that the employees would have been paid but for the official's 
unconstitutional action, but does that question show us whether the 
burden of using the agency's operating funds for back pay is an 
"intolerable" burden?154 
The Schlajly result certainly has a visceral appeal. Where 
unconstitutional action is charged, however, its intolerable burden 
test offers little firm guidance to courts faced with a sovereign 
immunity argument concerning relief. Basically tautological in 
conception, it leads ultimately to a wholly subjective inquiry. 
2. An Affirmative Relief Test 
A second line of cases trying to define the sovereign immunity 
aspects of relief also focuses on Larson's footnote eleven.155 These 
cases ignore the footnote's "may" language, assume that all 
affirmative relief is barred, and then try to determine what relief is in 
fact affirmative and what is only prohibitory. Thus the test becomes 
not the tolerability of the relief but whether the relief should be 
characterized as affirmative or negative. 
The Eighth Circuit, in State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 156 
used this approach in considering the same impoundment issue that 
the Seventh Circuit faced in Schlajly v. Volpe. 157 As in the functional 
analysis used in the "intolerable burden" test, the court attempted to 
discern what is in fact "affirmative" relief by focusing on what would 
have happened but for the defendant official's action.IS8 Thus 
applied, the affirmative relief test suffers the same drawbacks noted 
in the intolerable burden test. 159 
u• Cf. Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (order of back benefits to welfare 
recipients necessarily diminishes amount available for others). 
us For the text of the footnote seep. 346 supra. 
uo 479 F.2d 1122, denying rehearing to 419 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). 
157 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed at p. 348 supra. 
ua479 F.2d at I 123 (citations omitted). Similar arguments have been advanced by 
commentators with regard to other disbursement situations. See Block, supra note 35, 
at 1063-64; Davis, supra note 35, at 15-16. 
119 Seep. 349 supra. 
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Nor does it seem possible to decide whether a relief order is 
affirmative or negative by referring to its inherent nature. Whether 
an order is classified as prohibitory or mandatory depends to a great 
degree on how the court chooses to word its order;160 to prohibit an 
official from refusing to undertake an act is often no differenr from 
compelling him to act.161 Thus, this approach too appears to offer 
little help in devising standards for sovereign immunity issues in the 
relief context. 
3. The Inductive Logic Approach 
Some courts and commentators have come to the conclusion 
that an analytical solution to the problem of sovereign immunity 
implications of relief is hopeless. Finding the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in sovereign immunity cases to be confusing and 
contradictory, 162 they look only at the case results, try to determine 
what kinds of relief seem to give the Court the most trouble, and 
from the results inductively formulate a few simple rules. 
This approach has met with mixed success. Most law review 
articles begin by cataloguing the cases decided one way and 
another,Z63 try inductively to formulate some guidelines, and end up 
declaring the whole line of cases a disaster area.164 Many draw the 
conclusion that cases dealing with damages against the government 
or disposition of government-held property are likely to face 
160 See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). There, the Secretary of State had 
denied Miss Elg a passport "solely on the ground" that she was not an American 
citizen. /d. at 349. She established her legal right to American citizenship. In 
considering what relief to grant, the Court faced the question of whether the Secretary 
of State should be included in the Court's decree. The Court decided. that despite the 
Secretary's powers of discretion regarding passports, mandamus should issue. "The 
decree," reasoned the Court," ... would in no way interfere with the exercise of the 
Secretary's discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude 
the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American 
citizenship." /d. at 350. 
'"See Block, supra note 35, at 1073-74 (arguing that the distinction between 
affirmative and negative relief is in most cases artificial). 
'"See Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1974); Knox Hill Tenant 
Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Littell v. Morton, 445 
F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971); cf. Zapata v. Smith, 437 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
163 E.g., Davis, supra note 35, at 8-17; Cramton, supra note 31, at 400-05, 422-27; 
Block, supra note 35, at 1063-75. 
164 E.g., Cramton, supra note 31,418-20. 
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dismissal on immunity grounds, 165 but they seem able to account for 
the developments only in historical terms. 166 While some recommend 
legislative reform to clear the air, 167 others suggest maxims to guide 
the Court. 168 
The inductive logic approach has a respectability brought on by 
Supreme Court usage, the most recent example being Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Edelman v. Jordan. 169 Rather 
than trying to formulate a general rule, Justice Rehnquist was 
satisfied simply to define the area of concern, payments from the 
government treasury. 170 The remainder of the opinion is devoted to 
showing that in futuro relief orders do not necessarily require 
treasury payments or disrupt fiscal planning while retroactive 
payments do have such an impact. 171 
Yet the precedents are not as clear as Justice Rehnquist would 
have us believe, and that is the problem with the inductive logic 
approach. For every case forbidding relief that has an impact on the 
public treasury, a contrary opinion approving such orders can be 
found. Indeed, the Court, only one term after its Edelman opinion, 
approved by unanimous vote a relief order requiring the treasury to 
pay out funds appropriated for water pollution control projects.172 
161 See, e.g., id. at 402, 423; Davis, supra note 35, at 8-18; Block, supra note 35, at 
1072-73. 
1
" See, e.g., Block, supra note 35, at 1073. 
1
" E.g., Cramton, supra note 31, at 428-29 (recommending a proposal by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States); Borchard, supra note 35, at 3. 
161 E.g., Davis, supra note 35, at 17 (government responsibility is to be preferred 
"over irresponsibility"); Laski, supra note 35, at 466 (the real need is the enforcement 
of responsibility); Cramton, supra note 31, at 415 (ask whether the benefits of review 
are outweighed by interference with government programs). 
169 415 U.S. 651 (1974). For an earlier example see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 714-15 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
110 !d. at 663. 
171 !d. at 664-70. The extent to which Edelman might affect state employment 
discrimination cases is unclear. Monetary recoveries, whether for attorneys' fees or 
back pay, seem to be in jeopardy, although it remains to be seen whether both would 
be treated the same under Edelman. As to attorneys' fees, compare Jordan v. Fusari, 
496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974), with Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), 
Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir. 1974). An en bane opinion is 
expected soon to resolve the split on this issue within the Fifth Circuit. Compare Gates 
v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), with Named Individual Members v. Texas 
State Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974). 
111 See Train v. City of New York, 95 S. Ct. 839 (1975). The Court accepted the 
government's concession of the sovereign immunity issue, id. at 843 n.7, which was 
more fully litigated in the lower courts. See City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033, 
1038-39 & n.l2 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affg, 358 F.Supp. 669,673 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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Among the older cases, conflicting decisions relating to land decrees 
and money judgments are numerous. 173 
These inductive logic approaches do not advance our inquiry 
because they identify problem areas without telling us why they are 
prob~em areas. They identify the types of relief that courts are 
reluctant to grant, but they do not explain the cause of the 
reluctance. Why are affirmative orders to release public funds 
permitted in some cases but forbidden in others? Why were 
judgments against sovereign land and the public treasury thought to 
raise sovereign immunity problems? Might interference with 
executive control over hiring and promotion be thought to raise 
similar considerations in the 1970's? 
The next Section of this Article will try to develop an analytical 
framework that is consistent with the considerations expressed in the 
original Larson-Dugan exceptions and that can identify which 
considerations are important in cases where affirmative relief against 
federal officials in their official capacities is requested. This mode of 
analysis builds on our traditional constitutional law notions of 
separation of powers. It is these considerations that hide behind the 
mask of sovereign immunity. 
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A SEPARATION OF 
POWERS ISSUE 
A. The Larson-Dugan Exceptions 
Any discussion of sovereign immunity doctrine as a device for 
allocating constitutional decisionmaking power must be based upon 
an appreciation of the substantive constitutional roles of the several 
branches of government. This Section provides that background. It 
also goes further and shows how the Larson-Dugan exceptions, the 
elemental jurisdictional rules of sovereign immunity, define the 
interface between the basic substantive roles performed by the 
judiciary, Congress, and the executive. In suggesting that separation 
of powers interests accurately account for the Larson-Dugan 
jurisdictional aspects of sovereign immunity, we lay the groundwork 
for a later showing that these interests also underlie the sovereign 
immunity aspects of relief. 
"'See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 (1962) (land); compare Cunni!lgham 
v. Macon & B. R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883), with Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 \Vall.) 
203 (1872); compare Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884), with Hagood v. 
Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886). 
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I. The Judiciary's Power and Obligation 
We begin with two straightforward propositions about judicial 
power. First, the Court in its role as interpreter of the Constitution is 
competent to decide constitutional issues whenever it has proper 
jurisdiction. Second, that power is not merely permissive, it is 
mandatory and carries a corollary duty to provide redress for 
constitutional violations whenever possible. The first proposition 
looks like black letter law, but it runs up against the sovereign 
immunity doctrine under which courts have refused to exercise their 
otherwise proper jurisdiction. The following discussion will suggest 
that sovereign immunity as a self-limiting device is quite possibly 
unconstitutional. That argument will be the predicate for later 
establishing that sovereign immunity must have its roots in 
limitations due to the prerogatives and powers of another branch of 
government and not in judicial self-denial. 
The competence of the federal courts to hear and determine 
constitutional issues springs from article III and Marbury v. 
Madison. 114 The Court's appellate jurisdiction under article III gives 
it an independent institutional power. Although Congress may by 
statute limit this jurisdiction, 115 the Court's interest is sufficiently 
strong, it has been argued, that any wholesale attempt to limit 
Supreme Court review of constitutional questions would itself be 
unconstitutional. 176 
174 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). The power assumed in Marbury to rule on the 
constitutionality of congressional statutes was later used to pass on the question of 
whether actions taken by federal and state executive officials were consistent with 
constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (civil action); 
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (habeas corpus) (both cases 
involving unconstitutional action by federal officials); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (state 
officials). The Court recently reaffirmed its authority to determine whether the other 
branches of government had overstepped their powers. United States v. Nixon, 418 
u.s. 683,703-05 (1974). 
m U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The power of limitation extends only to the 
appellate jurisdiction. A legislative restraint on district court jurisdiction may limit the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction from those federal courts, Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441 (1850), but will not limit the Court's appellat.e jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, which still may come up through the state courts. 
17
' See Hart, Tlte Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Congressional Power 
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction oftlte Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157,201-02 
(1960); cf. R. Berger, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969). But 
see Wechsler, Tlte Courts and tlte Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005-06 
(1965). 
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If Congress cannot undercut the Court's power to decide 
constitutional questions, neither may the Court itself refuse to do its 
job of constitutional adjudication. It may not decline to exercise the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution177 and Congress.178 
As Chief Justice Marshall said a century and a half ago in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 179 
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction 
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, 
avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the 
constitution . . . . We have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to 
the constitution.180 
Certainly the Court's appellate jurisdiction has become more 
discretionary since the introduction of certiorari, but that manner of 
controlling the docket may properly be characterized as a congres-
sionally mandated exception to jurisdiction as authorized under 
article lll. 181 Similarly, although the Court has developed techniques, 
as Justice Brandeis called them, "for its own governance in the cases 
confessedly within its jurisdiction,"182 these practices are not truly 
refusals to hear a constitutional issue. Rather they are either 
demands that the issue be framed in a manner capable of judicial 
resolution or methods for exercising jurisdiction and deciding the 
case, albeit not on constitutional grounds.183 Indeed, on those 
Congress has at times limited appellate jurisdiction as to certain causes of actions, 
see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), but with little impact on the 
Court's actual appellate review power, see Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 
(1869); 2 Warren, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 455-
95 (1935 ed.). In this century Congress has by statute approved a complete Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction as to constitutional issues. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-58 
(1970). 
171 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
178 28 u.s.c. §§ 1252-58 (1970). 
119 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
''"!d. at 404. 
"' U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
112 Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
"' See id. at 346-48. Brandeis' rules one (adversariness), five (standing), and six 
(standing), and perhaps two, fall in the first category and stem from the constitutional 
limitation on the court to hear only "cases and controversies." Cf Association of 
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Brandeis rules three 
(narrow ruling), four (nonconstitutional grounds), and seven (narrow statutory 
356 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 10 
occasions when the Court, by stretching one of the Brandeisian rules, 
has come close to evading its constitutional duty to hear 
constitutional questions, it has drawn heavy fire} 84 Adjudicating the 
constitutional issue when it is properly presented is still recognized as 
the Court's constitutional responsibility.t85 
An unlimited sovereign immunity doctrine would contravene 
this constitutional duty. Unlike delaying techniques which only 
initially sort out issues between the state and federal courts, 186 an 
unlimited immunity doctrine completely cuts off adjudication in all 
federal courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has 
developed the Larson-Dugan exceptions to sovereign immunity, for 
at least the second exception regarding unconstitutional action is 
constitutionally required. 187 The Court cannot decline to exercise its 
article III jurisdiction to decide the claim of unconstitutional action. 
The power and duty to hear constitutional questions also 
extends to relief, for the Court is obligated to give effective relief to 
vindicate the constitutional rights at issue. Where lower courts have 
rendered a form of relief that does not eliminate the constitutional 
wrong, the Supreme Court has consistently ordered188 that more 
coercive measures be applied. For example, in Turner v. Fouche, 189 the 
plaintiffs had proved a statistical prima facie case of racial 
discrimination in juror selection, and the district court ordered the 
jury box refilled. When the new composition yielded statistics that 
construction), and perhaps two, fall into the second category mentioned in the text. 
When in the second category of cases the Court cannot settle t~e parties' dispute by 
deciding the nonconstitutional issues, it must then consider the constitutional issue. 
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
'"See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I, 16 (1964) ("The 
Brandeis rules are a far cry from the neo-Brandeisian fallacy that there is a general 
'Power to Decline the Exercise of Jurisdiction Which Is Given,' that there is a general 
discretion not to adjudicate though statute, Constitution, and remedial law present a 
'case' for decision and confer no discretion.") 
111 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 102 (1968). 
116 E.g., abstention, see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 
U.S. 411 (1964); the Prentis doctrine, see Prentis v. Atlanta Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 
210 (1908); comity principles in injunctions against state prosecution, see Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
117 Even the first exception would also seem to be constitutionally required where 
the cause of action is based on federal law or where the authority challenged is set by 
federal law. See Gunther, supra note 184, at 16. 
'"See Race Quotas, supra note 6, at 141-46 (1973) (giving a history of the school 
desegregation cases). 
119 396 u.s. 346 (1970). 
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would be sufficient to prove continuing discrimination, the plaintiffs 
asked for but were refused more specific relief. The Supreme Court 
reversed, stating that any relief that failed to end the discrimination 
would require further .. corrective action by a federal court charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing constitutional guarantees." 190 
The Court, therefor~, is constitutionally obligated not only to 
hear and determine the constitutional issues properly brought before 
it but is also under a collary duty to provide the relief necessary to 
redress the prevailing party's constitutional rights. Any refusal to 
provide relief, other than on the usual equitable grounds,l91 must 
therefore arise out of the Court's appreciation that the power to take 
remedial action is constitutionally committed to another branch of 
government. 
2. Executive and Congressional Powers 
Notwithstanding the separation of powers, Congress and the 
executive typically act in concert, with the first formulating the laws 
and the second executing them. This interplay of presidential and 
congressional power was analyzed in Justice Jackson's concurring 
opinion in the Steel Seizure Case!92 The gist of Justice Jackson's 
argument is that the President's powers are derived from two 
sources, his own inherent constitutionally allotted powers and those 
powers conferred upon him by Congress in his capacity as the 
executor of the nation's general laws. Congress in turn has its own 
powers conferred by the Constitution. When exercised in the absence 
of inherent presidential power, these congressional powers properly 
direct and control the executive's actions. 193 
Of course, in most instances Congress and the President work 
together in carrying out their constitutional roles. 194 This legislative-
'
90 /d. at 359. 
'" Seep. 367 infra. 
"'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952). 
Equitable considerations which limited relief by referring to the parties' respective 
situations would not be considered self-limitations by the Court. Seep. 363 infra. 
'"See 343 U.S. at 635-37. 
••• In the great majority of these situations, the executive branch acts in some 
administrative manner and that ends the matter. Presidential enforcement of 
congressional directives usually produces no involvement with the judiciary unless 
Congress has directed the President to use judicial process to enforce the law, e.g .• 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), or a private citizen seeks judicial 
process to insure that members of the executive branch enforce the law as Congress 
directed, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S., (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
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executive interplay may obscure the essential constitutional reality 
concerning the President's power: he often acts not from his own 
constitutional power as a decisionmaker but from the discretion and 
power that Congress has given him.195 Indeed, an attack on the 
constitutionality of executive action in enforcing statutes always 
resolves itself into the question not whether the executive had 
constitutional power to act but whether Congress had such power.196 
The Larson-Dugan ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity 
thus preserves Congress' control over executive authority in the areas 
where the President's powers derive from his role as executor of 
Congress' laws. The ultra vires exception forbids the defendant 
official to claim immunity for actions that are outside the scope of 
the authority Congress has given him, thus effectively forcing the 
executive branch to conform its actions to Congress' legislated 
wishes. 197 
Similarly, situations not covered by the Larson-Dugan 
exceptions may be seen as areas where the judiciary, lacking any 
article III interest of its own to assert, 198 defers to the joint power of 
m See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 630-31 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., concurring); Wilbur v. United States ex rei. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 (1930); 
United States ex ref. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343 (1920). Occasionally it is suggested 
that Congress gives too much discretion to the President. Compare Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), with Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 
(1944). 
196 See, e.g .. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 
U.S. 253 (1967); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) 
(congressional employees). 
The President has his own constitutional powers as well, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, 
chiefly relating to foreign relations and control of the armed forces. The. powers 
el'plicitly granted are actually quite meager and often also require the consent of the 
Senate. But the el'plicit powers conferred have often served as the focal point for 
greater implied powers. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright El'port Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The power implied may 
become so wide as to create friction with the powers of other branches of government. 
See, e.g., United States v. Nil'on, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Note, Congress, the President, 
and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968). This 
aspect of the President's inherent power will be considered at pp. 360-63 infra in the 
section dealing with sovereign immunity and relief. 
197 See Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1920); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 
185 U.S. 373 (1902) (injunction to control abuse of discretion granted; no sovereign 
immunity). The parallel between the mandamus and sovereign immunity doctrines is 
discussed exhaustively in Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 
1954), vacated as moot 349 U.S. 909 (1955). 
191 See pp. 354-57 supra. 
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Congress and President. Thus applied, sovereign immunity protects 
the full range of federal lawmaking power from challenge as long as 
that power is exercised within constitutional bounds.199 Even the 
Court's practice of strictly construing putative waivers of sovereign 
immunity ensures that it will play no role in this area except as 
prescribed by Congress.200 
Seen in this light, the Larson Court's rejection of the "mere 
illegality" exception to sovereign immunity201 becomes an important 
decision Of constitutional law not unlike those rendered by a 
chastised Court after 1937. Cases such as Wickard v. Filburn202 and 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis203 marked the end of the Court's 
predilection for judging statutes by the Justices' own sense of a 
higher generallaw.204 Similarly, since the "mere illegality" exception 
was based on finding official violations of general tort law, rejection 
of that exception took the Court out of the business of finding 
"general law" and left it to Congress to decide what national policies 
should be pursued. 205 
The Larson-Dugan exceptions, therefore, operate at a level of 
analysis where the constitutional powers of the three branches of 
government are easily accommodated. The judiciary carries out its 
primary role of interpreting and applying the Constitution while 
deferring to congressional and executive power to make and apply 
general law, to exercise unreviewable lawmaking power in all the 
range of issues permitted by the Constitution. Furthermore, at this 
199 Since Congress' authority is defined by the Constitution, the only challenge to 
congressional authority can be on constitutional grounds. The judiciary has no power 
to inquire into Congress' discretionary, decisionmaking. Cf Powell v. McCormack, 
395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
200 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,590 (1941); cf. Canadian Aviator 
Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945). See generally HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 4, at 1351-56. 
201 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 699-702. The 
exception had been employed earlier in Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926). 
202 317 U.S. Ill (1942). 
20
' 301 u.s. 548 (1937). 
204 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 {1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 
U.S. 525 (1923). For a contemporary historical account of the Court's assumption of 
these general review powers, see Jacobson, Federalism and Property Rights, 15 
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 319 (1938). 
20
' The Court's role in making general law is now interstitial, filling in gaps left in 
legislation, either by necessity or by congressional directive. See Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 
762-69, 800-06, 830-32. In no manner does the Court displace congressional decisions 
in this area as it did before 1937. 
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general level the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity also 
coordinates the roles between the executive and Congress, insuring 
that Congress' directives are obeyed when the executive strays from 
its authority, yet allowing full executive discretion when the executive 
is acting within its authority. The judiciary itself plays no role in the 
lawmaking and enforcement process except to the extent allowed by 
statute.206 
B. Separation of Powers in the Relief Context 
As seen above, the Larson-Dugan exceptions operate to confine 
each branch of government to its constitutional area of respon-
sibility. In the relief context, however, the Supreme Court's power to 
decide constitutional issues and to provide relief can conflict with an 
equally explicit exclusive constitutional power of another branch to 
deal with the subject matter of the Court's proposed relief order. It is 
precisely such a conflict that is at the heart of the warning against 
affirmative relief in Larson's famous footnote eleven. 
1. General Considerations 
The Larson footnote cited a single authority/07 but it was only 
one of several old cases in which plaintiffs' requested relief would 
have compelled an officer to perform a basic legislative function such 
as levying a tax208 or appropriating government land to private 
parties.209 Indeed, the Court went so far as to divide land cases into 
two classes: those where the defendant officer claimed title without 
right and those where he claimed title by virtue of legislative act. 
Those cases seeking relief against the legislative act were held barred 
by sovereign immunity.210 
,.,. E.g., in enforcing statutorily ,created causes of action, in creating federal 
common law when invited to do so by Congress or to flesh out Congressional policies. 
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); note 55 supra. 
It should also be noted here that the accommodation of powers discussed in the text 
above is not an abstract and logical meshing of powers but rather a compromise 
worked out and accepted over time as a necessary consequence of the Court's 
assumption of the power of constitutional interpretation in Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S, (I Crnnch) 137 (1803). 
207 337 U.S. at 691 n.l1, citing North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890). 
"'E.g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890). 
109 E.g., Cunningham v. Macon & B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); see Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 713-15 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
210 See, e.g., Noble v. Union R.L.R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (government claim to 
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The Court's unwillingness to infringe on legislative functions in 
the state context is evident in the Court's recent decision in Edelman 
v. Jordan. 211 Allowing future relief could be justified on the theory 
that the legislature was free to decide whether to pay or discontinue a 
program; retroactive relief was barred because it left no decision to 
the legislature.212 
2. The Test 
At the relief stage of litigation the court has before it a precise 
governmental action which the plaintiff wants undertaken, and the 
issue, under the separation of powers analysis, is whether the 
judiciary is the branch of government which may make that remedial 
decision or whether the Constitution commits the decision on that 
narrow issue to some other branch. More precisely, we noted above 
that in cases where the Larson-Dugan exceptions allowed it to act, the 
judiciary is performing its own constitutionally mandated function of 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.213 The narrow question 
at the relief stage becomes whether that general power is negated by 
the Constitution's specific grant of authority to another branch to 
decide the issue raised in the proposed relief decree.214 
land based only on official's ultra vires act; railroad deemed to hold title by 
congressional authorization and relief giving it title granted); Cunningham v. Macon 
& B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (state sovereign immunity context; relief denied where 
state by legislative act maintained title in land). For a modern example of a court 
trying to come to grips with the issue, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1968) (suit to establish title in land). 
The cases are collected in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 nn.6, 7 (1962). 
Malone did not reach the question ofrelief since the plaintiffs failed to clear the initial 
hurdle of showing the Larson-Dugan exceptions tp be applicable. /d. at 646-48. 
211 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See pp. 346-47 supra. 
212 /d. at 666-69 and n.ll. Of course, the state legislature in Edelman was not one 
of the three branches of the federal government. But the states are in a real sense 
situated, in relation to the Court's review power, no differently from the coordinate 
branches of the federal government. The Court has therefore adopted comity 
principles which give the same respect to state institutions as the Court would grant to 
the federal branches of government under a separation of powers analysis. See Mayor 
v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,615 (1974). 
213 See pp. 353-60 supra. It was noted, moreover, thai the exceptions work in such 
a manner that the court plays its role in constitutional interpretation while not 
interfering with the general power of the legislative and executive branches to make 
and enforce law at their discretion in all of the area allotted to the federal government 
by the Constitution. 
214 This is the inquiry adopted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for deciding 
separation of power issues. 
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The inquiry therefore begins with the Constitution's text. Where 
power to decide the issue is explicitly conferred by the Constitution 
on another branch of government, as with the President's pardoning 
power,215 that apparently ends the inquiry.216 But, as we noted 
earlier,217 the powers of each branch of government have been 
expanded through recognition of implied and inherent powers, and 
therefore the Court will be faced in most cases with the task of 
determining the scope of the power implied from the Constitution's 
text. 218 If the Court is unable to find the matter explicitly committed 
to another branch, it may employ a variety of inquiries into the 
strength of its own power, any lack of power being taken as a sign 
that the power to decide lies with another branch. 219 
If one approaches the sovereign immunity issue from this 
perspective, it becomes immediately clear why treasury-opening 
decisions, such as that in Edelman v. Jordan, 220 activate the immunity 
defense, while decrees like that in Train v. City of New York,m which 
ordered the release of impounded funds, do not bother the Court. 222 
The separation of powers approach deals not with notions of 
"sovereign" powers but with the specific powers of the other 
branches of government. Payment from the treasury implicates the 
power of the legislative branch,223 which by specific constitutional 
mandate possesses the exclusive power to raise the money needed by 
m See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
m See, e.g., ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
'"See pp. 354-60 supra. 
211 See, e.g .. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,518-48 (1969). 
219 See id. at 517-18, 548-49; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211-26 (1962). The Court 
also asks, for example, whether the relief at issue is subject to "judicially manageable 
standards." !d. at 226. The lack of such standards might convince the Court that the 
issue, narrowly drawn, is constitutionally allotted to the Court as much as to another 
branch. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (guaranty clause puts 
reapportionment issue before Congress), with Baker v. Carr, supra, at 226 (judicially 
manageable standards under equal protection clause give power over same issue to 
the Court). 
210 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court has faced the same issue with regard to federal 
defendants. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945). 
211 95 S. Ct. 839 (1975). 
222 The issue is raised at p. 352 supra, in connection with our criticism of the 
inductive logic test for judging whether relief would violate sovereign immunity. 
111 Since the Edelman case deals with a state treasury, a separation of powers 
analysis does not technically apply. However, the same approach is employed under 
comity principles. See note 212 supra. For a federal sovereign immunity case 
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government and determine how it .is to be spent.224 Since the power to 
pay out the nation's money rests with Congress, the Constitution, by 
its separation of powers, prevents the Court from ordering payments 
in cases such as Edelman. By the same reason the Court can order 
relief in cases such as Train, for there Congress has already exercised 
its constitutional power, having made the determination under 
article I that the money should be paid out for a specified purpose. m 
The separation of powers approach to the sovereign immunity 
aspects of relief has one overarching benefit. Functionally it puts the 
court in the role it knows and which it has since Marbury v. Madison 
sought to play-that of interpreter of the Constitution. A voided are 
such essentially political inquiries as whether relief would impose an 
intolerable burden on government.226 Certainly deciding if the 
Constitution allots power on a given issue exclusively to one branch 
or another is a difficult task;227 but it is essentially the same job that 
the Court undertakes whenever it decides the constitutionality of a 
statute or executive policy. As the Court recently reiterated in United 
States v. Nixon, 
·oeciding whether a matter has in any measure been 
committed by the Constitution to another branch of 
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds 
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate 
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a re-
sponsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution.'228 
analogous to Edelman, see Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 
(1945). 
"'U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7 (revenue bills originate in House),§ 8 (power to lay and 
collect taxes, pay debts), § 9 ("No· Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law •.. "). 
m See Train v. City of New York, 95 S. Ct. 839,843 (1975). 
226 See pp. 348-51 supra. 
227 This is especially true with the increasing assertion of "inherent," i.e., non-
textual, constitutional powers. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,703-07 (1974) 
(executive privilege); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974) (asserted inherent 
executive power to control spending by a fiscally irresponsible Congress). 
228 418 U.S. at 704, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); cf. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520-21 (1969). 
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C. Employment Discrimination Relief· Applying tHe Separation of 
Powers Analysis 
The separation of powers approach to deciding sovereign 
immunity aspects of relief may be illustrated by consideration of the 
federal employment discrimination problem. As was discussed in 
Section I of this Article, the Larson-Dugan exceptions apply to claims 
of unconstitutional discrimination in federal employment, thus 
allowing the suits to be heard on the merits. 229 the question then 
arises as to what kind of relief is within the court's power, and the 
concern behind the question is possible interference with the 
executive branch's control over government employment affairs.230 
The starting point is the separation of powers test: a constitutional 
violation having taken place, the courts have the power and are 
under the duty to remedy the violation unless such relief would 
impinge upon a substantive power allocated by the Constitution 
exclusively to the executive branch. 231 
There are explicit presidential powers regarding the selection of 
a certain level of government employees, for example, judges and 
certain high officials.232 With respect to executive officials, the power 
carries with it an inherent presidential power to discharge them at his 
pleasure.233 Even if the President or his advisors discriminate at this 
level, the Constitution might be read to assume that this cost is worth 
the benefits to executive effectiveness. Similarly, the President and 
his military officers might conclude that a war effort required 
discriminatory decisionmaking in armed forces promotion practices. 
That might be deemed within the President's power as Commander-
in-Chief.234 Of course, we can only speculate here because the 
presidential power, not being explicitly conferred by the Con-
219 See p. 343 supra. 
210 See p. 347-48 supra. Relief involving back pay •would come within the 
examples of congressional power of the purse discussed above. See pp. 362-63 supra. 
Since there is an adequate remedy at law for the back pay claim, see Chambers v. 
United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971), Congress' having waived its sovereign 
immunity interest in controlling the nation's purse, see id. and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) 
(1970), the only remaining issue to be examined is that of injunctive relief. 
m See pp. 361-62 supra. 
m U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. Senate approval is required. 
m See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey's Executor v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
m U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
Cf. Ballard v. Schlesigner, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975). 
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stitution, would have to be delineated on a case by case inquiry into 
the scope of the President's implied powers.235 
Whatever the extent of the implied presidential power with 
regard to tenure of higher level officials, it seems clear that it could 
not reach down to cover the general run of government employees. 
The constitutional text extends the power of appointment only down 
to "inferior officers" and that power itself comes to the President 
only as directed by Congress.236 Thus, it appears that the power to 
control the employment of even inferior officers is more in line with 
the concept of the President's role as executor of Congress' 
directives, rather than any exclusive power of his own.237 Moreover, 
even granting an inherent power, it would take a strained 
interpretation to bring all federal employees within the scope of the 
term "inferior officers. " 238 
The refusal to recognize such inherent presidential power over 
federal employee tenure also accords with both our traditional and 
recent practices concerning suits by federal employees. Traditionally 
the Court shied away from involvement in employee suits, but it 
founded its reluctance on equitable grounds because there was an 
adequate post-removal remedy at law.239 In recent years both the 
courts240 and Congress241 have limited the executive's control over the 
general mass of government employees. Indeed, the Court's most 
recent_pronouncement on this issue in Sampson v. Murray, 242 while 
refusing to grant interim relief in most circumstances, nevertheless 
maintains the Court's shared power with Congress and the executive 
to act in employee suits.243 
"'See, e.g., cases cited in note 233 supra: Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-26 
(1962). 
236 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
2
" See pp. 357-58 supra. 
m Cf Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1061 (5th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion) 
(arguing, without success, that state troopers are "officers," rather than "employees," 
of the state). 
239 See, e.g., White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898). The more extreme reluctance of 
earlier cases appears to derive from the elementary nature of statutory standards for 
testing the legality of eStecutive dismissial of employees. See Keirn v. United States, 
177 U.S. 290,293-94 (1900) (arguing that "in the absence of statutory regulation," the 
President must be allowed discretion, else the employee is effectively tenured for life). 
In Sampson v. Murrary, 415 U.S. 61, 72 (1974), the White line of cases was read only 
for the narrow proposition that "interim injunction relieP' could not be granted to 
control employee discharges. 
240 See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
241 See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78-83 (1974) (describing the "broad 
regulatory" structure Congress has created in the area of employee rights). 
242 415 u.s. 61 (1974). 
243 /d. at 92 n.68. Of course, were we to consider the power to discharge employees 
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Moreover, in personnel matters any claimed right to dis-
criminate runs counter to statutorily declared national policy244 and 
executive orders issued by the President that forbid unconstitutional 
discrimination in federal employment. 245 Any assertion that the 
executive branch needs to control all underlings to insure that the 
laws are faithfully executed is necessarily limited by these 
declarations. Thus, discrimination by lower federaJ supervisory 
personnel cannot be considered as an implementation of presidential 
policy or power.246 
Nor can it be accepted that employee complaints are unsuited to 
judicial resolution and thereby inferentially within the power of some 
other branch.247 Just as the Court found its equal protection 
standards applicable in reapportionment suits/48 they are also 
applicable in employment cases.249 Indeed, the judiciary's vast 
experience with employment cases insures its competence in these 
matters. 250 
In sum, then, injunctive relief in an employment discrimination 
case cannot be seen as trenching on the exclusive domain of another 
branch of government and thus should not be barred by sovereign 
immunity principles. Although this analysis leaves little room for 
governmental officials to shield their discriminatory personnel 
decisions, it should be emphasized that a court would only order 
such relief as would be constitutionally necessary. 251 Consequently, in 
to be an inherent, exclusive executive power, then even congressional legislation would 
be an intrusion upon that power and would therefore be unconstitutional. See Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In practice we have usually assumed that the · 
government needed congressional authority to justify executive regulations governing 
employee rights. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101,7151-54,7301,7311,7321 (1970). 
lU 5 u.s.c. § 7151 (1970). 
115 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), superseded in part 
by Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969). 
'"See Service v, Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
"'Seep. 262 and n.219 supra. 
"'See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-37 (1962). 
"
9 Cf. Ballard v. Schlesinger, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
u.s. 677 (1973). 
"
0 The cases decided under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III, 1973) and other statutes 
are too numerous to mention here, For a sampling see cases noted in 42 U.S.C.A. at 
277-521 (1974). There is no reason to believe that the mastery of problem solving 
techniques built up in this area cannot also be used in handling suits against federal 
officials. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. III, 1973) (adopting same standards for 
judicial decision in suits against feder~l officials as previously applied to private 
employers). 
211 See p. 266 supra. 
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most situations such long-accepted remedies as reinstatement or 
prohibitory relief might prove acceptable in ending the 
discrimination.252 Moreover, whatever interest the executive branch 
has in running its own affairs would be vindicated through the 
application of usual equity principles. 253 
CONCLUSION 
The reluctance of several federal courts to entertain federal 
employee discrimination suits has led us to a general reexamination 
of the doctrine on which the decisions were based-sovereign 
immunity. Inherited from the English legal system, the doctrine has 
survived, I suggest, because in its revised American formulation it 
serves to maintain the separate constitutional powers of the three 
branches of our federal government. 
At one level of application the doctrine's rules are firmly 
established, the Supreme Court having long recognized two 
exceptions to sovereign immunity that in effect comprise the 
doctrine. These exceptions, which the deviant federal employment 
discrimination cases failed to follow, permit suits to be heard against 
federal officials who have acted outside their statutory authority or 
in an unconstitutional manner. Therefore, as later circuit court 
decisions have held, suits alleging unconstitutional employment 
practices by federal officials deserve a hearing on the merits. 
Even though a case may be heard on the merits, relief may also 
raise sovereign immunity problems. At the relief phase of litigation, 
the Supreme Court has established no firm rules similar to the two 
exceptions applied at the pleading stage of the suit. While claims for 
money from the treasury or for title to public land are certain to raise 
problems, it is unclear why such relief should be banned under the 
rubric of sovereign immunity, and, accordingly, one can never be 
quite certain what relief other than land and treasury claims would 
252 Cf Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). Only in cases where discrimination was 
proved throughout a department or agency would more coercive relief be required. 
The guiding standard for the court would be whether it could expect the defendant 
officials to remedy their constitutional wrongs from their own affirmative action. See 
Race Quotas, supra note 6, at 172. 
"'E.g., mootness, see Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); but see Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co. v. I. C. C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); existence of an adequate remedy at 
law, see Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971). One commentator 
has argued that these traditional devices are completely adequate to keep in bounds 
any feared flood of litigation. Block, supra note 35, at 1081-85. 
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be similarly barred. This Article has argued that separation of powers 
notions underlie the Court's actions concerning relief, thus 
suggesting a method of analysis that can give more objective content 
to the term "sovereign immunity" at the relief stage of litigation. 
Applying the separation of powers approach involves the courts 
in a task they know well-constitutional interpretation, for the 
courts must ask whether the relief they have been asked to grant 
would invade powers committed exclusively to_ another branch of 
government. In suits charging federal employment discrimination, 
very few, if any, forms of injunctive relief would be forbidden 
because the Constitution commits few powers to the President in this 
regard. 
